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On the Evolution of
Depression
Mike W. Martin

KEYWORDS: Depression, morality, mental disorders, psychobiology, evolutionary psychiatry.

I

“DEPRESSION AS A MIND–BODY PROBLEM,”
Walter Glannon outlines a psychosocial-physiological explanation of depression as a psychological response to chronic stress—today, especially social stress—in which cortisol imbalances
disrupt neurotransmitters. Accordingly, treatment
for depression should combine psychopharmacology and psychotherapy—a valuable reminder
in light of the current restrictions on funding for
health care (Hobson and Leonard 2001). My
comments focus, however, on Glannon’s objections to evolutionary theorists who explain our
capacity for depression as adaptive to the natural
and social environment. His objections are implausible because he fails to distinguish depression as a mood and a disorder.
N

What Is Depression?
Explaining the psychology, sociology, physiology, and evolution of depression presupposes
knowing what depression is and hence what is
being explained. As a blunt but important distinction, let us contrast depression as a mood
and as a mood disorder.
As a mood, depression is a state of low spirits,
typically involving painful and low affect (of a
kind needing further specification). Not all negative low moods are depressions. It is notoriously

difficult to distinguish depression from grief, sadness, gloom, and a host of additional ways to feel
down—especially because today many people use
“I’m depressed” as a blanket expression for virtually any low mood. For the purposes of this
paper, it is not necessary to attempt a full-blown
analysis of depressed moods (and emotions). I
would emphasize, however, that depressed moods
involve values. They involve negative evaluations
of ourselves, major events in our lives, life in its
entirety, or the values that have been guiding us.
Typically, to be depressed is to experience such
things as feelings of worthlessness, dejection about
failures, despair and hopelessness, and loss of
caring and commitment. Thus, we might be sad
or grieving but not depressed because we retain a
solid grip on what is valuable and worthwhile. In
any case, there should be no general presumption that depressed moods are all bad or undesirable. Instead, we should be prepared to appreciate the importance of depressed moods in
connection with questions of value, identity, and
even moral insight (Martin 2000). Depressed persons are not necessarily sick.
In contrast, depression as a mood disorder is,
by definition, pathologic. Moreover, usually it is
not a depressed mood, although it involves depressed moods. On the one hand, depression as a
disorder is defined as pathologic, a notion that is
itself understood in terms of values—the values
of health and, indirectly, moral values that define
what is culturally acceptable. Thus, even severe
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grief can be nonpathologic, even though it involves depressed moods, when it is within the
range of “culturally-sanctioned responses” (APA
2000, xxxi). On the other hand, only sometimes
is depression a single pathologic mood, as in
major depressive episodes that can strike with a
terrifying and suicidal severity (APA 2000, 375).
Usually, however, the pathology is not a single
depressed mood, but instead a longer-term state
involving recurring depressed moods and additional features, such as poor concentration, insomnia, poor appetite or overeating, and so on.
For some purposes, such as research funding and
billing insurance companies and government
health providers, these pathologies can be equated with what is currently in the DSM. Yet, there
are many additional states of suboptimal health,
in which the DSM criteria are only partly met.
What does Glannon mean by depression? He
does not define it, but he makes it perfectly clear
that he intends depression as a disorder. Or rather, it is a set of mental disorders, including the
“depressive disorders” of major depressive disorder, dysthymic disorder, depressive disorder
not otherwise specified, and a variety of bipolar
disorders and some anxiety disorders. Glannon
sometimes indicates his primary topic is “severe
depression,” which of course is not a DSM category (nor always a mark of pathology). For the
most part, however, he says his topic is “chronic
depression,” which might suggest dysthymia, “a
chronically depressed mood for most of the day,
for more days than not, as indicated either by
subjective account or observation by others, for
at least 2 years” (APA 2000, 380). I suspect,
however, that Glannon intends something broader
than dysthymia, perhaps including most pathologic states that significantly involve depression that
is severe and recurrent. Such a broader conception
would allow him to bypass the vagaries of the
DSM classifications, which fluctuate as its editions
change. Nevertheless, he seems to target disorders that involve primarily depressed moods, rather than bipolar disorders, and he explicitly sets
aside posttraumatic stress disorder. In any case,
because parts of his paper are concerned with the
physiology of depression, it might be helpful to
more fully specify the disorders being explained.
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My main concern, however, lies elsewhere. In
a brief section titled “An Adaptive Response?”
Glannon calls for a sweeping rejection of explanations developed by evolutionary psychiatrists and
psychobiologists to explain why we have evolved
as creatures who suffer depression (and lots of it).
According to these evolution theorists, depression serves various adaptive purposes. Glannon
argues that these theorists are mistaken because
depression is a set of maladaptive disorders: “depression is an adaptive disorder consisting in an
individual’s inability to adjust to the social environment. It is not a defense mechanism serving
an adaptive purpose for the survival of the organism.” In making this claim, he assumes that
the evolution theorists mean what he means by
depression—namely, mental disorders. Do they?

Maladaptive Disorders Versus
Adaptive Defenses
Are the evolutionary theorists trying to explain (a) the evolutionary purposes of depressed
moods (both healthy and unhealthy ones) or (b)
the evolutionary purposes of depression as a mood
disorder only? Glannon assumes (b), but (a) is
closer to the truth. I say closer to the truth
because evolutionary psychiatrists also sometimes
fail to distinguish (a) and (b). Even so, Glannon
fails to engage the evolutionary theorists on their
own terms, and sometimes he seems to attack a
straw man.
As an example of someone who clearly intends (a) rather than (b), consider Randolph M.
Neese’s “Is depression an adaptation?” (2000),
an essay that Glannon explicitly targets. After
noting the unclarity about what depression means,
Neese stipulates that for his purposes “depression will refer to severe states of negative affect
that are often but not necessarily pathologic, and
low mood will refer to states in the common
range of normal experience” (Nesse 2000, 15).
He notes the intuitive starting point that much
low mood and depression are normal and become pathologic only in some forms and under
some conditions. Then he seeks an explanation
of both depression and low mood, concluding
that although many depressions are pathologic
(maladaptive), many other depressions and low
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moods are adaptive in helping us deal with defeat and danger.
It seems likely that low mood and related
negative affects were shaped to help organisms
cope with unpropitious situations. Some negative and passive aspects of depression may be
useful because they inhibit dangerous or wasteful actions in situations characterized by committed pursuit of an unreachable goal, temptations to challenge authority, insufficient internal
reserves to allow action without damage, or lack
of a viable life strategy (Neese 2000, 18).
In Evolutionary Psychiatry, another work targeted by Glannon, Anthony Stevens and John
Price (2000) give credence to “attachment theory
explanations” of depression, as well as to Neese’s
escape-and-avoidance theory that focuses on competition and rank conflicts. Attachment theory
emphasizes that love and other deep bonds of
affection involve (as one mark of “depth”) grief,
sadness, guilt, shame, and other forms of distress
when the love is lost or threatened. These emotions can easily degrade into pathologic states.
Stevens and Price are less careful than Neese in
defining depression, but it is clear they are explaining a wider range of low-mood states and
then subsuming pathology as a maladaptive distortion. Depressive disorders, they tell us, are
best “understood as chronic exaggerations of
innate behavioural potentials with which all human beings are equipped by virtue of their humanity” (2000, 48).
Glannon is not accurate, then, when he says,
tout court, that evolutionary theorists portray
and explain pathologic depression as adaptive.
The theorists are not saying there is pathology in
every depressed-mood withdrawal from competition and response to the loss of love. Instead,
the theorists are explaining how humans came to
possess general capacities for depressed moods
that enter into a continuum from adaptive to
maladaptive. These general types of explanations
have great interest and promise, in my view, and
Glannon provides no reason to reject them. Stated more positively, Glannon’s psychophysiologic
explanation of depression as a disorder is compatible with the work of the evolutionary theorists.
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To confuse (or clarify?) matters further, let me
suggest that evolutionary psychiatrists often interweave two different types of explanation of
mood disorders, what I will call adaptive-sickness explanations and malfunctioning-defense
explanations. Adaptive-sickness explanations
explain why mood disorders sometimes serve
purposes beneficial to individuals and groups.
These explanations seem paradoxical, because
by definition disorders are maladaptive or dysfunctional. In fact, the paradox is superficial. A
disorder can be maladaptive in some ways (indicated in its defining criteria) and adaptive in
other ways (given serendipitous circumstances).
It is commonplace, but interesting, that maladies
of many kinds can have good side effects (Sandblom 1995). For example, the maladies that take
away a writer’s ability to walk might provoke the
writer into greater commitment and concentration that result in an explosion of creativity (Price
1995). Similarly, it is amply documented that
mood disorders sometimes play creative roles in
the lives of artists (e.g., Lord Byron), leaders
(e.g., Abraham Lincoln), and others (Jamison
1993).
Malfunctioning-defense explanations seek to
explain a broader category of moods (or other
mental states) as frequently adaptive psychological defenses against stress and anxiety, and then
they portray mood disorders as breakdowns or
distortions of those defenses. That is, they do not
portray pathologies as adaptive; on the contrary,
the disorders are maladaptive perversions of processes and states that normally functions adaptively. Glannon, too, provides explanations of
this sort. (In doing so, I might add, he distinguishes psychological defense mechanisms, which
he says help us to avoid harm and social realities,
and disorders. Yet, defense mechanisms, the idea
introduced by Freud and refined by neo-Freudians, can serve healthy or unhealthy purposes.)

One Cheer for Depression
Clarity about definitions and distinctions, I
have suggested, is essential in gaining clarity about
what is being explained and assessed in evolutionary psychiatry and psychobiology. It is also
important in connection with therapy and self-
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understanding, in determining what is unhealthy
or not, and in understanding the continuum between health, suboptimal health, and full-blown
disorders. Indeed, our choice of terminology already reflects our attitudes. If we think of negative low moods as inherently undesirable then
we will tend to use the word depression to connote sickness. If we discern value in many negative low moods we will be more likely to use the
word depression to refer to a broad range of
moods, most of which are normal and some of
which are pathologic (Neese 2000, 15).
Furthermore, if we view all depressed moods
as bad, we will have to usurp some other term to
connote the wider range of healthy emotions.
For example, Lewis Wolpert (1999) stipulates
that (all) depression is pathologic and then uses
sadness for wider range of emotions: depression
is malignant sadness. For reasons I gave earlier, I
think we should keep the broader sense of depression, and not equate depressed moods with
sadness. No doubt that reflects both my attitudes
and my idiolect.
Historically, attitudes toward depression (melancholy, acedia, etc.) have varied greatly (Radden 2000). At one extreme, much everyday depression is defended and even celebrated, a view
associated with Romanticism. (I still remember
that in an undergraduate course on English Romanticism I was graded down for failing to appreciate how much the Romantics value states
that today we pathologize.) Some philosophers
continue that positive emphasis on the desirable
aspects of depression as part of a value-guided
life (Solomon 1976). At the other extreme are
the pathologizers, not just some Prozac-profligate psychiatrists but also many up-beat Americans who require steady and ever-increasing states
of augmented cheerfulness to get through the
week. In between are a variety of nuanced attitudes, including Susanna Kaysen’s (2001) aptly
expressed realism in giving “one cheer for melancholy” as unpleasant but often useful.
Evolutionary explanations of depression blur
over most of the nuanced roles of depression in
individual lives and cultures. Their broad-brushed
explanations focus on only one value, however
important: survival. Evolutionary theory is tele-
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scopic: it observes big and complicated terrain from
a great distance. In contrast, physiology is microscopic: it sees big and complicated terrain from
close up. Telescopes and microscopes reveal much,
but they also neglect much that is important in
appreciating the nuances of the value-permeated
world of human beings. Worse, they carry the
danger of reducing complex value dimensions of
human life to something simpler—a danger to
which sociobiology fell prey (Midgley 1995).
Glannon’s interest is mental health, but even
our conceptions of mental health are immersed
in a broader set of values than survival—values
about morality and meaningful life. Furthermore,
many psychologists have come to appreciate the
need for focusing not only on disorders and
threats to survival, but also on positive conceptions of health as well-being beyond the mere
absence of disease (Snyder and Lopez 2002). I
suspect that psychologists’ current explorations
in positive health will yield new insights into the
positive contributions of depressed moods to
meaningful life. In any case, depression as a mood
raises important questions about moral values at
several junctures: the value judgments internal to
the mood (e.g., self- or world-denigration); the
values under assault by the mood (e.g., loss of
caring); defining the line (blurry) line between
healthy moods and depressive disorders; therapeutic judgments about the best course of treatment for depressive disorders and suboptimal health.
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